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ABSTRACT: This study examines the 
productivity performance of Balkan firms 
within and outside the European Union 
(EU), including the influence of loans. A 
multiple treatment model is used to com-
pare the effects on productivity of member-
ship and loans both separately and collec-
tively, which in the case of loans allows a 
separate analysis of their influence on firms 
in non-member states. The use of condition-
al quantile regressions measures the effect 
on productivity of membership and loans 
separately as treatment variables. This pro-
vides an analysis of where the treatment 
influence is greatest across the distribution 
curve and identifies the significance of se-
lected control variables on the outcome. In 
the full sample, the findings indicate that 
EU membership and loans have a positive 
effect on productivity, with membership be-
ing more important than loans. Outside the 
EU, firms in receipt of loans are more pro-
ductive than those without. However, the 
significance of both membership and loans 
is restricted to the lower end of the produc-
tivity distribution curve. The manufactur-
ing sample shows that EU membership has 
a significant positive effect across 70% of 
the deciles measured, whilst the influence 
of loans is restricted to the lower deciles, 
with rental capital (leasing) also positively 
significant in the lower four deciles. In the 
services sector, however, membership is sig-
nificant up to 90% of the distribution, with 
loans at 60%. 
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FIRM PRODUCTIVITY IN THE WESTERN 
BALKANS: THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNION 
MEMBERSHIP AND ACCESS TO FINANCE
INTRODUCTION1 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the influence of EU membership and 
access to finance on the productivity of firms in the Western Balkans. It analyses 
the productivity performance of EU firms against those within the accession 
process and identifies whether a strong institutional and regulatory framework 
is relevant. It also confirms findings in the literature (see Levine 2005; Volz 
2010) that loans contribute to improved productivity and, by disaggregating the 
full sample, it identifies these influences across specific business sectors and 
examines the impact of EU membership and loans across the productivity 
distribution curve, identifying areas of maximum influence across both full and 
disaggregated samples.  
It is claimed that the expansion of the EU from 15 to 27 states in the period 
2004–2013 led to significant economic and geopolitical benefits for the new 
member states (NMS) of Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovenia. However, the case of 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, 
countries in the pre-accession process raises the question of whether 
enlargement fatigue will prevent these countries ever achieving membership. In 
these countries in the 1990s, ethnic wars caused hardship and significant 
disruption to societal and institutional development, issues which must be 
addressed before accession can be considered (Vachudova 2014). “Since the 
early 2000s the EU has emerged as the primary actor in state building in the 
Western Balkans. Based on a dual strategy of state building and European 
integration, the EU has sought to replace other international organisations in 
the post-conflict reconstruction of the Western Balkans” (Bieber 2011, p.1783). 
This study explores, at the firm level, the impact of EU membership and access 
to loans on firm productivity in the Balkan countries of Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and 
Slovenia. It compares the levels of output per worker in EU member countries 
with those outside the EU and uses capital, cost per worker, skill level, foreign 
ownership, size, age, bureaucracy, and competition as control variables. 
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovenia are already EU member states and Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia are theoretically part 
of the pre-accession process.  
                                                            
1  This study was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council project ‘Access to 
Finance for SMEs’ under Grant number ES/M002462/1. 
8
Economic Annals, Volume LXII, No. 215 / October – December 2017
Significant literature exists on the macroeconomic relationship between the EU 
and the Balkans (see Bieber 2011; Bechev 2012; Petrovic and Smith 2013; 
Prokopijević and Tasić 2015). This study extends the debate and explores 
whether, at firm level, there are productivity opportunities to be gained through 
EU membership. New trade theory states that firms become more productive as 
a result of increasing economies of scale and network effects (Krugman 1979). 
The EU is a customs union of 27 counties, which facilitates the development of 
these attributes and provides a platform to encourage foreign direct investment 
and exports, the key drivers of improved productivity.  
Additionally, there is evidence that lack of access to finance is a constraint on 
firm-level growth in non-EU member countries, whereas, with respect to 
leverage, there is convergence within the EU. Thus, it would appear that within 
the EU, as a result of improved financial intermediation, access to finance 
improves, while outside the EU, credit constraint continues to be a problem. 
However, correlation should not imply causality (EBRD 2016).  
Until recently, the contribution of finance to economic growth and 
development was not fully recognised in economic literature, although there is 
now a strong theoretical foundation for the argument that finance can provide a 
stimulus to productivity (Levine 2005). This has been increasingly supported by 
empirical research, some of which specifically relates to transitional countries 
(Volz 2010).  
However, there have been few firm-level studies on the impact of EU 
membership and finance on firm performance in the Balkan region (Shimbov et 
al. 2016; Botric 2013; Berman and Haricot 2010), and this paper contributes to 
this under-researched area. The study focuses on all firms and includes a 
disaggregated analysis of services and manufacturing. Enhancing productivity is 
of greater consequence in developing economies than in the developed world 
because improvement within a national cohort of heterogeneous firms results in 
the evolution of a more effective industrial base (Roberts and Tybout 1996)  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
relevant theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 outlines the data and 
methodology used, and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes. 
FIRM PRODUCTIVITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
9
1. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The Western Balkans are increasing their participation in international 
production networks (IPN) where fragmentation of the manufacturing process 
has created an interwoven network of inter-industry trade flows across 
countries, involving the transition of intermediate goods across borders until a 
final assembly destination is reached (Gabrisch et al. 2016; Shimbov et al. 2016). 
This vertical integration trend led to the new trade theory (NTT) hypothesis 
that the main factor determining international trade is economies of scale and 
the network effects occurring in key industry sectors. These can be sufficiently 
significant to outweigh the more traditional theory of comparative advantage. 
This study concentrates primarily on the ‘new’ trade theory originally espoused 
by Krugman in 1979, in which he developed his general equilibrium model of 
non-comparative advantage trade, arguing that returns to scale are an important 
determinant of growing international trade (Krugman 1979). This has led to 
research seeking to determine the effect of trade policy and multi-factor content 
on productivity, profitability, exports, firm size, imports, and the effect on local 
producers.  
In his literature review, Tybout (2003) concludes that foreign competition 
causes price cost markups to fall and locally based firms to contract or even exit 
the market. International trade allows larger, more productive firms to expand 
their market base, thus creating greater efficiency, while exporters increase in 
size, are more efficient, and supply better quality products. Hence, unfettered 
access to the EU 15 developed market economies, allied to increased 
competition because of imports from the same source, conforms to Tybout’s 
findings and new trade theory. It would therefore be prudent to evaluate the 
success of those Balkan countries which are members against those which are 
not. At the macroeconomic level, convergence between the EU 15 (countries 
joining before 2004) and the Balkan countries appears to be occurring at a slow 
pace. This might indicate that some key determinants are not in place (Botric 
2011). Conflicting views in the literature relate to the advantages of EU 
accession (Börzel 2011), and whilst his paper emphasises governance issues, 
which could be interpreted as political failure, others claim that there is an 
inherent developmental divide between the Western and Eastern European 
states which the EU is failing to rectify. Epstein (2014) claims that in areas of 
consumption and FDI the type of investment encouraged by the EU has 
contributed to both a division of labour and exclusion from innovative 
processes, thus depriving the Eastern states of economic gains. She further 
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criticizes the World Bank and other supra-national institutions for having an 
overly optimistic view of the benefits of EU expansion, resulting from the 
imperative of supporting the neoliberal agenda (see also Epstein and Jacoby 
2014). Furthermore, the internalisation of the Washington Consensus paradigm 
and its application throughout the customs union provides a further 
justification for an alternative view of the potential benefits of membership (see 
Lutz and Kranke 2014; Fitoussi and Saraceno 2012). 
Borocz (2012) claims that Hungary has failed to capitalise on EU membership 
due to the dominance of EU capital in assembly plant manufacturing, resulting 
in high import content in relation to exports allied to labour market failure. The 
unrelenting claims of supra-national institutions and the tendency amongst 
economists to accept the neoliberal agenda as a given drowns out the discordant 
views of dissenting voices. Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: EU membership provides a productivity advantage to firms within 
the new member states. 
Recent academic literature reveals the relevance of the link between finance and 
firms' productivity growth, and whilst this study is not confined to research on 
SMEs, they represent 90% of the sample (Levine 2005). A study by the World 
Bank (2014) reveals that in emerging markets, more than 50% of SMEs are 
credit-constrained, 70% do not use external financing from banking or equity 
financial institutions, and of the 30% receiving credit, 15% are underfinanced 
from these sources (Hölscher et al. 2016). 
Wagner (2014), in his survey of credit constraints and international trade, 
suggests that work carried out in this area is itself constrained because results to 
date cannot be compared because of the different econometric models used, 
with an added limitation that there is a paucity of sound measures of credit 
constraint for smaller companies.  
Access to finance by SMEs has long been problematical. Debate has focussed on 
whether the existence of information asymmetries creates credit shortages or 
credit gluts (EBRD 2015). In this study the basis of the analysis of loans on firm-
level performance is contained in Levine’s (2005) review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on finance and growth. Levine identifies five main ways by 
which, in theory, finance contributes to economic growth: the availability of 
savings, investment information, the management of risk, the existence of a due 
FIRM PRODUCTIVITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
11
diligence process, and the facilitation of trade in economic commodities and 
services. Such considerations provide a good reason for suggesting that finance 
has an important role to play in development, but they do not, as Levine (2005) 
argues, constitute a rationale for preferring banks over other forms of finance.  
According to Levine (2005), the dominant form of empirical research has been a 
cross-country study linking economic growth to a measure of financial 
development. The potential importance of firm-level studies in resolving a 
number of issues, including better detailed information, causality, and firm 
heterogeneity, have long been acknowledged in the literature. Nonetheless, there 
are few firm-level studies on the effects of finance on productivity and other 
aspects of firm performance (Hölscher, et al. 2016).  
A recent study by Levine and Warusawitharana (2014) makes a significant 
contribution, in part by enhancing the theoretical foundations for the link 
between finance and productivity growth, and finds that financial frictions 
affect both investment and output per worker. There is some evidence that, 
following the accession of the new member states, credit constraint was 
responsible for the lack of productivity improvements in relation to the more 
established members of the EU. In relation to the transitional economies, 
Djalilov and Hölscher (2016) find evidence that banks and the financial sector 
provided the early transition economies, namely the new member states, with 
greater credit availability than the states of the old Soviet Union. Furthermore, 
they had lower loan loss provisions and less reliance on equity, indicating a level 
of greater efficiency and strength in depth within the banking sector. Literature 
suggests that the predominance of foreign banks with enhanced credit scoring 
criteria, allied to the necessity to improve capital ratios at home, may be 
contributory factors, together with the underdevelopment of capital markets 
(Caviglia et al. 2002; Thimann 2002; Volz 2010; Estrin and Uvalic 2016). There 
is little evidence of exploration of the relationship between the level of 
productivity, accession to EU membership, and access to finance, although work 
done suggests a reduction in productivity due to misallocation and credit 
constraint. Gabrisch (2015), however, maintains that a major factor in credit 
constraints is the level of nonperforming loans and the reluctance of 
policymakers to confront the issue; and this, together with a poor level of 
financial intermediation, lies at the heart of the problem of access to finance. 
This paper contributes by identifying the effect of membership and receipt of 
loans both inside and outside the EU, and through the use of quantile regression 
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measures where along the productivity distribution curve the greatest influence 
lies. Therefore, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: The availability of loans enhances the effect of EU membership. 
Hypothesis 2b: The availability of loans improves performance in firms outside 
the EU. 
Hypothesis 2c: The availability of loans improves productivity. 
Since Slovenia and a further eight Eastern European transitional economies 
acceded to the EU in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and 
Croatia in 2013, the question has arisen whether the countries of the Western 
Balkans could be integrated more promptly. Barriers to membership remain 
within the Balkan five (Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and 
Serbia) and whilst this paper does not focus on foreign direct investment (FDI), 
there is empirical evidence that a negative attitude towards investing in the 
Balkans can be alleviated, to some degree, by EU membership (Estrin and 
Uvalic 2016). Other factors include the size of the economies and distance from 
investment hubs, but principally the paucity of institutional processes. There is 
“a negative ‘Western Balkans’ effect” on FDI (Estrin and Uvalic 2013, p.5), 
resulting in the need for firms to find alternative sources of finance, either from 
an internal capital market or in the form of loans. The Western Balkans were, 
however, the recipients of substantial capital inflows prior to the financial crisis 
of 2008, but were subjected to significant outflows thereafter (Gabrisch et al. 
2016), and it is plausible to suggest that different investor priorities rather than a 
negative attitude to the Balkans may be an alternative rationale for the paucity 
of FDI. There was an assumption amongst economists that the privatisation 
programme undertaken by the Eastern European transition economies would 
result in a significant improvement in firm-level performance. The result has 
been more nuanced, with firms bought by foreign investors being significantly 
more productive than those in domestic ownership (see Gabrisch and Hölscher 
2006; Wagner 2012; Estrin et al. 2009; Irdam et al. 2015; Waldkirch 2014). From 
the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence we formulate the following: 
Hypothesis 3: FDI has a positive influence on firms’ productivity in both the 
manufacturing and service sectors.  
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In relation to exports, a survey of 54 micro-econometric studies in 34 countries 
published between 1995 and 2006 shows that exporting firms are more 
productive than non-exporters (Fryges and Wagner 2007). Thus, it is important 
to control for exports in any study relating to productivity. Using firm-level 
data, Berman and Héricourt (2010) find that productive efficiency, when allied 
to access to finance, increases the propensity to export. Minetti and Zhu (2011), 
using Italian firm-level data, find that firms facing credit constraints exhibit 
weaker export performance.  
Hypothesis 4: Exports positively affect firms’ productivity in the manufacturing 
and services sectors. 
The EBRD Transition Report for 2014 focuses on innovation as a driver of 
productivity, but recognises that capital intensity (capital per worker), proximity 
to the main business centre (infrastructure), skilled labour, competition, and 
foreign ownership are also important determinants. Additionally, firms trading 
nationally or internationally are more productive than firms primarily targeting 
local markets (EBRD 2014). The literature also reveals that a more competitive 
market results in improved productivity (Bridgman 2010). Clearly, membership 
of the EU significantly increases the competitive environment. Within the 
transitional economies there were concerns about the development of 
competition policy, although these have been largely allayed (Gabrisch and 
Hölscher 2006). Within the new member states there is evidence that “a well-
designed and well implemented competition policy has a significant impact on 
TFP growth” (Buccirossi et al. 2013, p.1334). It is assumed that the greater the 
skill base the more productive the firm and, evidence suggests, the greater the 
proportion of highly skilled workers the more positive the result for labour 
productivity and profit. A more comprehensive review of Western Balkan 
competitiveness and productivity constraints can be found in Gabrisch et al. 
(2016), who emphasise the necessary improvements required in infrastructure 
and institutional development. These additional determinants have an influence 
on the productive environment and are therefore legitimate covariates to EU 
membership and loans, which are the treatment variables in this paper.  
The regression analysis controls for capital, skilled labour, competition, exports, 
and foreign ownership, together with infrastructure and institutional 
development. The outcome variable ‘productivity’, measured as output per 
worker, is selected as a measure of firm-level performance due to its importance 
for economic growth. A comprehensive review of the literature suggests that 
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whilst managers have a good deal of control over the endogenous determinants 
of production, they can do little about exogenous influences (Syverson 2011). 
Whilst a large body of literature exists on the subject (see Syverson 2011 for 
more detail), the majority deals with the specific issues grounded in theory: little 
exists that examines the relative performance of firms subjected to significant 
economic change, the materiality of fund flows, and capital allocation. 
Besides EU membership as a treatment variable (which is self-explanatory), the 
second treatment variable, loans, is constructed from the question in the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 2013 (BEEPS): “At 
this time, does this establishment have a line of credit or a loan from a financial 
institution?” This then allows the comparison of the productive performance of 
those in receipt of loans with those with none. Campos et al. (2014) investigate 
whether EU membership improved both per capita income and labour 
productivity, using synthetic counterfactual methodology which measures the 
outcome against a synthetically produced counterfactual of the outcome if 
membership had not been achieved. They find that membership of the EU 
provided benefits for all countries with the exception of Greece. This study is an 
important contribution to the debate on the efficacy of EU membership and 
adds to that debate by comparing two groups of countries, one members and 
the other in the accession process, providing an insight into the differing 
performance of EU membership, non-EU membership, and loans in each of the 
two groups, augmented by an identification of the effect of observed variables 
on the outcome variable (output per worker) across the quantile distribution 
curve. Additionally, the scant literature analysing the effect of EU membership, 
and key determinants of firm level performance including access to finance, 
justify the claim that this paper contributes to filling a gap in research.  
METHODOLOGY 
This paper compares the influence of EU membership and, jointly and severally, 
receipt of loans on productivity (dependent variable) performance, measured as 
output per worker, of firms in the Western Balkans. The use of output per 
worker as a measure of productivity follows other papers which have used 
BEEPS data and log of sales divided by total employees for measurement 
purposes (see D’Souza et al. 2017; Pfeifer 2015; Waldkirch 2014; Dutz and 
O’Conell 2013; Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer 2013; Ricci and Trionfetti 2012). 
The comparison is between firms in EU member states and those outside, with 
the objective of measuring performance differences. The analysis identifies the 
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influence of membership and loans at points across the productivity 
distribution curve in order to include the significance of control variables 
selected with reference to the theory and literature. The selected methodology 
fulfils the key objective of ensuring a robust estimator to reduce bias on 
unobservables.  
We use a multiple treatment approach (with two treatment variables – EU 
membership and loans) and perform quantile regressions using the IVQTE 
Stata command, which has the advantage of producing analytical standard 
errors that are also consistent in the event of heteroscedasticity (Frölich and 
Melly 2010). Two distinct techniques are used, the Inverse Probability Weighted 
Regression Adjustment (IPWRA) estimator and quantile treatment effects 
(QTE) modelling. The former is based on the premise that the effect of EU 
membership and receipt of loans must be estimated as a treatment assignment – 
the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) effect. Essentially, the research 
follows the most common approach by matching, by means of propensity 
scores, EU firms and/or firms receiving loans (‘treated firms’) to non-EU firms 
with similar characteristics which have not received a loan (‘untreated firms’) – 
which thus constitute a comparison group – and then estimating the difference 
between output per worker (productivity) for treated firms and non-treated 
firms (Cerulli 2010).  
To safely attribute the estimated difference to a treatment assignment, treated 
firms must be similar to untreated in all respects except for EU membership 
and/or loan receipt. This depends on two identifying assumptions: the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA), or selection on observables, which 
posits that the outcome in the case of no treatment is independent of treatment 
assignment, conditional on covariates X (Imbens 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge 
2009), and the overlap or common support condition, whereby the estimated 
propensity scores take positive values (Heckman and Vytilacil 2007).  
Treatment effects are estimated in a multiple treatment context to ensure that 
EU membership and non-membership are carried out simultaneously. Lechner 
(2002) first introduced a matching approach with multiple treatments. There 
are M+1 treatments, whereby treatment equal to zero denotes the absence of 
both EU membership and loan receipt. The average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) effect is then calculated as: 
    | ( | )m lATT E Y T m Y T m  (1) 
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where m denotes the treatment level, l represents the comparison group (the 
treatment level to which m is compared), and Ym and Yl denote outcomes in 
states m and l respectively.  
The inverse probability of treatment weighting regression adjustment (IPWRA) 
estimator is employed, the main advantage being its double robust property. If 
either the propensity score model (the outcome model) or the treatment model 
is correctly specified, the estimator will yield treatment effects with a lower bias 
than other estimators not characterized by the double-robustness property 
(Hirano et al. 2003). The IPWRA estimator consists of three steps. Firstly, for 
each firm in the sample the treatment model estimates the propensity score, 
which is each firm’s probability of participating (‘treatment assignment’). Given 
that multiple treatment effects are evaluated, the propensity scores are estimated 
by a multinomial logit model, incorporating all four treatment levels: no EU 
membership and no loan, no EU membership with loan, EU membership and 
no loan, and EU membership with loan. The choice of the model is motivated 
by the nature of the treatment variable, which has more than two outcomes with 
no natural ordering. The propensity scores enable firms to be matched within 
each treatment level. Secondly, regressions are estimated by the fractional logit 
model, as the outcome variable is the inverse of the estimated propensity scores 
and is used as weights on covariates X and the treatment dummies. Thirdly, 
from each regression the ATT effect is computed as the difference in the 
weighted averages of the predicted outcomes. Valid standard errors (of the 
Huber/White/sandwich type) are reported, which take into account that the 
estimates are computed in a three-step approach (Emsley et al. 2008). 
Typically, the response variable y is some function of predictor variables X, so 
that y = f(X). Most regression applications focus on estimating rates of change 
in the mean of the response variable and are defined for the expected value of y 
conditional on X, E(y | X). This poses problems for regression models with 
heterogeneous variances, such as for firms across countries and industry sectors. 
Heterogeneous variances imply that there may be some changes that do not 
focus exclusively on the mean and others that impact differently across the 
probability distributions. Focusing exclusively on changes in the mean may 
underestimate, overestimate, or fail to distinguish real non-zero changes in 
heterogeneous distributions (Cade et al. 1999). 
FIRM PRODUCTIVITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
17
The introduction of quantile treatment effects (QTE) allows the measurement of 
the effect on the outcome variable (productivity) across the different percentiles 
of the productivity distribution curve, using median as opposed to the mean. 
The use of quantile regressions continues to evolve, and model selection is 
dependent on whether the QTE is conditional or unconditional and the 
treatment variables exogenous or endogenous. The conditional model is 
estimated, thus controlling for firm and market characteristics, and due to the 
lack of valid instruments in the datasets it is not possible to estimate conditional 
endogenous models. Thus, EU membership and access to loans are regarded as 
exogenous. This restricts the estimation strategy to the application of the 
estimator proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978). 
The standard for linear quantile regressions is a conditional model assuming 
selection on observables. It is assumed that Y is a linear function of X and D. 
The model for potential outcomes is: 
  
         0 di i i iY X d and Q  (2) 
So X is a vector of the conditional exogenous variables, i=1,……,n, and d  (0, 
1) is a set membership of the treatment variables EU membership or loans.   Q
refers to the  th  quantile of the unobserved random variable   i . . It is assumed 
that Qτ (εi| β, xi) = 0 and is introduced to ensure that the random errors are 
centred on the τ -th quantile (Marino and Farcomeni 2015).    and  are the 
unknown parameters of the model.   represents the conditional QTEs at 
quantile   . . The linearity assumption above is insufficient to identify the QTEs 
because the observation iD  may be correlated with  i . The assumption is that D 
and X are exogenous. The selection on observables with X can be taken to be: 
 ‖  ,D X  (3) 
ng Equations (2) and (3) together implies that     | ,Y X DQ X D , which 
allows the recovery of the unknown parameters of the potential outcomes from 
the joint distributions of the observed variables Y, X, and D. The estimator by 
Koenker and Basset (1978) can now be utilised to estimate the unknown 
coefficients: 
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                ,  arg min ,ˆ ˆ i i iY X D  (4) 
where          * 1( 0 . The IVQTE model used generates analytical 
standard errors that are also consistent in the event of heteroscedasticity 
(Frolich and Melly 2010).2 
DATA 
The data for this study was taken from the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) produced by the World Bank and 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). BEEPS is a firm-
level survey based on face-to-face interviews with managers and examines the 
quality of the business environment. The survey data has been used in more 
than 450 papers since 2012, which are published in a number of highly ranked 
journals (for a comprehensive list of examples see the methodology section 
p.10). The survey offers a representative picture of the business climate 
experienced by private firms together with firm performance and 
characteristics. The survey sample provides comparative data across time, 
countries, and firms, and allows disaggregation to size, sector, and regions. The 
data is used in academic and policy papers, with more than 300 papers written 
to date (World Bank 2016). Data was obtained from the 2013 survey consisting 
of nine countries in the Balkan region, three of which were EU members at the 
time of the survey.3 The sample allows the evaluation of the effect of EU 
membership on firm performance and the significance of loans and access to 
finance on firms in the EU and in countries in transition. Additionally, the 
influence of certain key determinants was measured (for the variable 
description, see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
The descriptive statistics in Table A2 in the Appendix indicate that the majority 
of the sample is service firms. Of a total of 2,433 firms, 90% (or 2,179 firms) are 
SMEs, as noted earlier, which, on the assumption that this reflects the total 
population, demonstrates their importance to the economy. Output per worker 
                                                            
2  A more comprehensive explanation of the estimation of quantile treatment effects in Stata 
can be found in Frolich and Melly (2010). 
3  The inclusion of Croatia as an EU member in this study may be controversial, since the 
accession date and survey results coincide. However, we believe that EU membership is the 
formal end to a process that has taken many years in transition and the economic conditions 
within the country would already conform to the Acquis Communautaire (Börzel 2011). 
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is broadly similar, with service firms being marginally more productive. 
Manufacturing companies have a larger capital base and a greater propensity to 
export. Between service and manufacturing firms the gap between costs per 
worker is significant.  
MODEL SPECIFICATION  
To estimate the individual and joint effects of EU membership and access to 
loans on productivity (measured as output per worker), the variable ‘treatment’ 
was created, with the following values: 
‐ Treatment (T) =0 if a firm is not in the EU and has not received a loan 
(57%); 
‐ Treatment (T) =1 if a firm is in the EU but has not received a loan (53%) 
‐ Treatment (T) =2 if a firm is not in the EU but has received a loan; (43%) 
‐ Treatment (T) =3 if a firm is in the EU and has received a loan (47%) 
The use of EU membership as a treatment variable allows a comparison of the 
productivity of firms within and outside the EU. This allows an analysis of the 
effect of the economic shock of joining a significantly more productive 
economic bloc.  
The outcome variable ‘productivity’ (measured as output per worker) is 
analysed in relation to EU membership and receipt of loans, whose relationship, 
as factors of production, is predicated on the premise that misallocation of 
capital following the adoption of the euro and a reduction in interest rates led to 
a reduction in productivity in Southern Europe (Gopinath et al. 2015).  
The selection of matching variables is predicated by reference to relevant 
literature where each has been identified as influencing firm-level performance.4 
To minimise the selection on unobservables the models include a large number 
of control variables (see Epifani 2003; Segerstrom and Gustafsson 2006; Bellack 
et al. 2008; Melitz and Ottaviano 2008; Bridgeman 2010; Covers 2014; Levine 
and Warusawitharana 2014; Waldkirch 2014; Estrin and Uvalic 2016). The list 
of matching (control variables) and their definitions is presented in Table A1. 
                                                            
4  Where values are monetary, they are measured in different currencies requiring conversion 
into a common currency. Using 2013 official exchange rates, national currencies were 
converted into US dollars.  
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There is some evidence that the NMS are beginning to achieve convergence with 
the original EU 15, albeit that due to economic stagnation within the Eurozone 
this is proceeding at a comparatively slow pace (Havlik 2015). Equally, the 
EBRD 2016 believes that progress in the Balkans is being retarded as a result of 
financial imbalances, credit constraint, and a lack of FDI (see also Estrin and 
Uvalic 2016). The misallocation of capital may be an additional constraint 
(Gopinath et al. 2015). This justifies the use of the second treatment variable: 
access to finance, measured as receipt of loans. 
Closing the productivity and technology gap between the transition countries of 
Eastern Europe and the EU is an important element in the need to achieve 
economic convergence and European cohesion. The influence of capital 
accumulation is critical, since it will both improve labour productivity and 
reduce the technology gap (Filippetti and Peyrache 2013). It is therefore 
important to control for capital in relation to the measurement of productivity, 
and since the BEEPS allows for the disaggregation of capital into ‘balance sheet’, 
‘replacement’, and ‘rental’ (leasing), it enables an analysis of the significance of 
each of these variables on the outcome. 
The justification for including ‘exports’ and ‘skilled workers’ in the control 
variables is based on Wagner (2012), who found that exporters were more 
productive and wage premia were statistically significant, indicating that skilled 
workers have a positive effect on firm productivity. Equally, in relation to skilled 
workers, there is evidence that Balkan industry lacks skill due to a mismatch 
between demand and supply, exacerbated by the educational failings of 
individual states (Gabrisch et al. 2016, Bartlett 2013). 
Employment rates in the Balkan region are problematical, with new EU member 
states at 64% and non-EU member states at 46%. Evaluating these figures, one 
might anticipate cost per worker to be suffering some downward pressure. 
However, a combination of labour market rigidity, incomplete reform 
programmes, a strong social welfare net, and migration of skilled workers has 
raised wages in relation to productivity, particularly in non-EU member states 
(Kovtun et al. 2014). To control for this, the variable ‘cost per worker’ is 
modelled.  
Foreign ownership is a reflection of FDI, and evidence exists that it increased in 
the period before accession to the EU, peaking on the date of accession and 
declining slightly thereafter. EU member countries have proved a more 
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attractive FDI destination than the Western Balkan states, evidenced by a 
negative effect in this region. This is possibly a result of the lack of institutional 
reform and the establishment of strong structural controls (see Krugman 1979; 
Epifani 2003; Estrin et al. 2009; Gustafsson and Segerstrom 2011; Estrin and 
Uvalic 2016; Okafor and Webster 2015). To control for this effect, the variable 
‘foreign ownership’ is included. 
The Acqui Communitaire (accumulated body of EU law and protocols since 
1958) has guaranteed the development of bureaucratic institutions within the 
new member states, although this process is also evident in Western Balkan 
countries in accession, where it is more prominent in Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia than in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Petrovic and 
Smith 2013). To control for this, the model variable ‘bureaucracy’ is included, 
but the inclusion should not imply that this of itself limits productivity (see 
Table A1 for variable description).  
With respect to firm characteristics, the model also includes firm size and firm 
age. The inclusion of competition is predicated on the new trade theory and 
specifically Tybout’s (2003) conclusion relating to the effect of foreign firms in 
relation to local pricing and firm survival. The influence of competition also 
resonates with international trade, which suggests that larger, more productive 
firms increase in size and are more efficient. Finally, to account for sectoral 
heterogeneity, the model includes dummy variables for low tech, mid-tech, and 
services. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
The first stage of the exercise is to use the IPWRA estimator to provide a 
comparison between EU firms and non-EU firms and for those with and 
without loans, and the second stage is to use quantile regression to identify 
where along the productivity distribution curve the effect of EU membership 
and loans is significant. The evidence can be laid alongside the influence at each 
quantile of selected control variables, which further informs the debate by 
allowing conclusions to be drawn as to the significance of the effects at certain 
points along the distribution curve. The disaggregated analysis allows an 
increased microeconomic evaluation of the result.  
Treatment effects of any matching estimator based on the propensity score are 
only estimated in the region of common support. Thus, it is necessary to check 
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the overlap of the propensity scores at different treatment levels. The overlap 
plots, reported in Appendix A (figures A1 to A3), reveal that the predicted 
probabilities are not concentrated near 0 or 1, which implies that the overlap 
assumption is not violated (Cattaneo et al. 2013). Descriptive statistics are 
included in Table A2. 
Step 1 of the estimation procedure is the treatment (selection) model, which 
shows the effects of covariates on the probabilities of different levels of 
treatment, whereby the base is treatment at level 0. Step 2 is the outcome model, 
which estimates the impact of covariates on the outcome variable. The 
coefficients in the models are not of interest in themselves, as the purpose of 
specifying the model is to facilitate the estimation of treatment effects (Cattaneo 
et al. 2013). Table A3 reports results for the model estimated in the full sample.5 
Table 1 below shows the estimated treatment effects using the IPWRA 
estimator. For ease of interpretation the results have been transposed into 
percentage point increases or decreases in productivity and expressed as a 
percentage in the text. The analysis covers the full sample of firms in all member 
states and disaggregated samples of services and manufacturing firms. The 
results from the full sample have been included for completeness. However, the 
paucity of observations for capital and skilled workers in the services sector has 
significantly truncated the observations and thus make the results of limited 
value. This limitation also applies to the quantile regression modelling. Tables 1 
to 4 below show different levels of observations. This is due to missing data for 
capital and skilled workers within the BEEPS dataset.  
 
                                                            
5  Results for manufacturing and services are not reported but available on request. 
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The analysis indicates that compared with treatment 0 (firms located outside EU 
which have not received loans) (T = 0), EU firms that have not received loans 
are more productive by 6.1% (percentage points)6 (p<0.01; Column 1). The 
effect of receiving a loan after EU membership is a 1.3% increase (Column 3), 
indicating that loans provide a marginal boost to output. However, the joint 
effect of EU membership and loan receipt is not statistically different from the 
individual effect of EU membership (Column 1), as their 95% confidence 
intervals overlap. This indicates that H1 is supported by these results, but H2 is 
not supported in relation to firms in EU member countries but is supported in 
non-EU firms, since the effect of a loan receipt is 3.9% (p<0.01; Column 2), 
indicating the efficaciousness of loans to firms in non-EU states. However, the 
joint effect of EU membership and loan receipt is not statistically different from 
the individual effect of a loan receipt, as their 95% confidence intervals overlap. 
This indicates that EU membership rather than receiving a loan is the key 
productivity driver in NMS, and whilst loans provide a marginal advantage 
within the EU they are critical to improving productivity in firms outside the 
EU. Thus, the efficacy of EU membership on productivity is proven for H1, but 
the influence of loan receipt is restricted to firms in non-member states (hence 
supporting H2c). 
In relation to the service sector the results are not statistically significantly 
different at 6.8% (p<0.01; Column 4). This effect increases to 8.1% when a loan 
is added to EU membership (p<0.01; Column 6). However, the joint effect of EU 
membership and loan receipt is not statistically different from the individual 
effect of EU membership, as their 95% confidence intervals overlap. Non-EU 
firms receiving loans are 4.3% more productive than non-EU firms without 
loans (p<0.01; Column 5), yet this effect is not statistically different from the 
joint effect of EU membership and loan receipt (Column 6). Thus, our results 
suggest that either EU membership or loan receipt has a positive impact on firm 
productivity, while the joint impact of EU membership and loan receipt does 
not result in additional productivity increase relative to their individual effects, 
and hence H1 is only partially supported.  
Within the manufacturing sector, EU firms without a loan are 5.9% more 
productive than non-EU firms without loans, indicating that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the full sample and each of the sectors 
                                                            
6  For reasons of brevity, percentage results are shown as a percentage, but should be 
interpreted as a percentage point increase. 
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(p<0.01; Column 7). However, EU membership combined with a receipt of 
loans has a statistically significant impact (p<0.01), although not larger than the 
impact of EU membership alone (Column 9). The effect of receiving a loan on 
productivity in non-EU firms is 3.6% (p<0.01; Column 8), indicating the greater 
importance of loans to non-EU firms. 
The IPWRA results test H1 and H2, including their subsections, and support 
H1, H2b, and H2c, showing that EU membership provides a productivity 
advantage, but there is little evidence that a combination of EU membership and 
loans (H1 and H2b) has an enhanced effect on membership alone; therefore, the 
enhancing effect of loans is unproven. However, H2b and H2c are supported in 
relation to firms outside the EU, concluding that loans improve productivity. 
The IPWRA results are concerned with mean effects and may not reveal the 
array of effects. The use of quantile regressions allows the analysis to identify 
where along the distribution curve the effects of EU membership and loans are 
significant and allows an evaluation of the influence of other key variables. The 
distribution of the dependent variable may change in many ways that are either 
not revealed or only partially revealed by an examination of the mean (Frolich 
and Melly 2010). This study applies selection models based on observables, uses 
a conditional treatment model based on Koenker and Basset (1978), and 
regresses on two treatment variables, EU membership and loans. The 
regressions in these analyses are carried out on the full Balkan sample and the 
disaggregated samples of services and manufacturing. The outcome variable is 
productivity (output per worker) and the treatment variables of interest are EU 
membership and loans. The control variables have been interpreted to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the significant influences extant in each quantile. For 
ease of observation, in all the QTE models below the first and last two quantiles 
have been included, since they either reflect the significant results across the 
productivity distribution or demonstrate a trend which either ends or continues 
before or after the 8th quantile.7 The estimates shown illustrate the significance 
of the results in each quantile across each of the distributions. The monetary 
values have been rescaled (actual number/1000) to provide a coefficient greater 
than zero where the results are significant.  
Table 2 below shows the results for the effect of EU membership (treatment 
variable) and the control variables on productivity performance over each point 
                                                            
7  The tables with the results for all the deciles are available on request. 
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(1st to 9th decile) of the productivity distribution curve. EU membership is 
positive and highly statistically significant (p<0.01) in the 1st to the 6th decile, 
with the coefficients decreasing in magnitude over the productivity distribution 
curve. This would suggest that firms at the lower end of labour productivity 
distribution enjoy the greatest benefit from membership, with no significant 
results being seen at the upper end of the scale. The importance of capital is also 
seen as significant, with ‘rental capital’ (p<0.01 to p<0.05) being important 
across the 1st to the 4th decile. This may suggest that below the median point of 
the distribution, equity, as a means of capitalisation, is in short supply (Estrin 
and Uvalic 2016). The negative coefficient on ‘age’ (p<0.05) in the 9th decile may 
indicate that older firms are less productive than more modern enterprises, 
indicating that they may be privatised firms at the top end experiencing issues 
with dated equipment and/or practices. The negative coefficient ‘replacement 
value of capital’ (p<0.01) is reported in the 5th and 8th deciles, which may 
indicate that firms are struggling to modernise in parts of the distribution curve. 
The positive significance of ‘bureaucracy’ (p<0.05) in the 1st and 9th deciles 
indicates that at the lower and top end of the distribution curve there is an 
awareness of the impact of institutional development, whilst ‘size’ (p<0.1) in the 
2nd and 8th deciles reveals that this may be restricted to the larger firms. The 
negative coefficient on skilled workers (p<0.01 to p<0.1) is possibly a reflection 
of a skills mismatch, allied to a failure of appropriate levels of educational 
training (Gabrisch 2016; Gabrisch et al. 2016). An OECD working paper 
concludes that “the main results suggest that higher skill and qualification 
mismatch is associated with lower labour productivity, with over-skilling and 
under qualification accounting for most of these impacts” (McGowan and 
Andrews 2015, pp.32). The positive coefficient of cost per worker (p<0.1) may 
be a reflection of the comparative advantage of cheaper labour.  
In relation to the services sector, all capital- and skill-based variables have been 
removed from the model due to a paucity of observations. In contrast to the full 
sample, the services sector indicates that the impact of EU membership is 
positive and highly statistically significant (p<0.01) for the 1st to 8th decile with 
no significance only amongst the most productive firms. This supports H1 and 
would suggest that the services sector as a whole has received a significant boost 
from EU membership. As in the full sample, a declining magnitude is found for 
the coefficient on EU membership variable, suggesting that the least productive 
firms enjoy the most benefit. ‘Foreign ownership’ has a positive and statistically 
significant (p<0.01 to p<0.05) effect throughout the distribution, supporting H3 
and indicating the relevance of FDI in tandem with EU membership. ‘Age’ and 
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‘size’ also have positive and statistically significant effects (p<0.01 to p<0.1 and 
p<0.01 to p<0.05 respectively), suggesting that larger, older firms are attractive 
to foreign investors. Outside the bottom first two deciles of the distribution 
curve the negative and highly statistically significant (p<0.01) influence of 
competition in the upper deciles of the distribution indicates that, in this sector, 
the competitive environment of the expanded EU is creating pressure for the 
most productive firms in the NMS. ‘Cost per worker’ has a positive and highly 
statistically significant (p<0.01) impact on firm productivity throughout the 
whole distribution range.  
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With respect to the manufacturing sector, the 1st and 2nd deciles of the 
distribution finds EU membership to have a positive and highly significant 
(p<0.01) effect, although significance levels and the magnitude of the 
coefficients decline above the 2nd decile, with the evidence suggesting support 
for H1 up to the 7th decile. ‘Balance sheet capital’ has a positive and significant 
effect in the 1st decile and the 8th decile (p<0.01 and p<0.1 respectively). ‘Rental 
capital’ is positively significant (p<0.05) across the first half of the distribution 
curve, suggesting that leasing is an important source of finance up to the 
median. The negative coefficients on replacement capital in the 3rd decile and 8th 
decile (p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively) indicate that replacing ageing assets may 
be problematical and points to a difficulty raising capital within the 
manufacturing sector, particularly amongst the least productive firms. ‘Firm 
size’ is statistically significant at the conventional level (from 1% to 10%) 
throughout the distribution, suggesting the importance of economies of scale, 
whilst ‘firm age’ has a negative effect in the 9th decile. In the upper and lower 
deciles the positive effect of ‘bureaucracy’ (p<0.05 to p<0.1) indicates the 
importance of institutional development. Negative effects of skilled workers and 
positive effects of cost levels per worker feature significantly (at the 1% and 5% 
levels) throughout the distribution and these findings are consistent with the 
earlier findings in this study.  
Table 3 below shows the results when loan receipt is the treatment variable. In 
the full sample, loans are only significant in the 1st and 2nd decile (p<0.01 and 
p<0.05 respectively), suggesting that efficacy is confined to the least productive 
firms, and therefore support for H2c is restricted to the bottom 20% of the 
productivity distribution curve. ‘Rental capital’ has positive and significant 
(p<0.01) effects in the 1st and 2nd deciles, confirming the necessity for borrowed 
capital below the median of the productivity distribution. ‘Bureaucracy’ and 
‘firm size’ are positively significant in the 1st and 9th decile, whilst ‘firm age’ is 
negatively significant (p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively), which may be indicative 
of older firms being less productive and larger ones having a greater realisation 
of the influence of institutional development. The positive but marginally 
significant (p<0.1) effect of ‘balance sheet capital’ in the 1st and 9th decile and the 
negative, but marginally significant (p<0.1) effect of ‘replacement capital’ in the 
9th decile may emphasise the impairment to productive development. The 
negative coefficient on skilled workers (p<0.01 to p<0.05) and positive 
coefficient of cost per worker (p<0.01) are features of results throughout the 
quantile regression models; possible explanations have been given earlier in this 
study.  
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In relation to the service sector, the capital and skill set variables have been 
omitted due to paucity of observations. Receipt of loans is positively significant 
(p<0.01) for the 1st to the 6th decile. This suggests that support for H3 is limited 
to just beyond the 60% median and that more productive firms have a limited 
benefit. With the exception of the 1st decile, ‘foreign ownership’ is positively 
significant throughout the distribution (p<0.01 to p<0.05), with the exception of 
the 9th decile where it is insignificant. This indicates that there is strong support 
for H3 within the services sector and emphasises its importance to the Balkan 
region’s economy. ‘Age’ is now seen as a positive attribute (p<0.01 to p<0.05). 
‘Firm size’ (at the conventional levels of significance, i.e., p<0.1) is positive 
throughout the distribution, indicating that together with age, it is seen as an 
important influence on firm productivity. The negative coefficient on 
‘competition’ appears significant across the distribution from the 3rd to the 9th 
decile (p<0.01 to p<0.1), increasing in magnitude at higher levels of the 
distribution curve. This indicates that the higher up the productivity curve, the 
greater the pressure from competition, affirming that larger, older firms are 
feeling the greatest competitive pressure. Loans appear to be more important 
below the median, which is the case even under foreign ownership. This may be 
the result of the provision of loans by the transnational companies, or the 
availability of collateral to lenders who are themselves foreign-owned banks. 
However, these findings support H2c and H3 and emphasise the importance of 
FDI in the sector, together with the availability of loans at the lower end of the 
spectrum. The importance of firm age and size suggests that older, larger, and 
more experienced firms are attractive to FDI. Above the 1st and 2nd decile the 
negative effect of competition is a reflection of increasing competitiveness 
within the enlarged EU, encouraged by the presence of foreign ownership. The 
ever-present positive significance of cost per worker (p<0.01) indicates that the 
service sector is comfortable with its cost per worker ratios. 
Regarding the manufacturing sector, loans are positively significant (p<0.05) in 
the 1st and 2nd decile, suggesting that within the sector the least productive firms 
are loan-dependent, and this view is supported by the positive effect of ‘rental 
capital’ (p<0.01 to p<0.05) in the same deciles. Therefore, the availability of 
loans and rental capital should be viewed in tandem. The results provide limited 
support for H2b and H2c, with no significant effect being seen above the 
median. ‘Size’ is positive and highly statistically significant (p<0.01) in the 1st 
decile and ‘foreign ownership’ (p<0.1) in the 3rd decile, together with the 
negative coefficient of replacement capital (p<0.05). ‘Age’ is negatively 
significant (p<0.05) in the 9th decile. This suggests that larger firms, possibly 
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privatised, see the opportunities of economies of scale but struggle to achieve 
productivity improvement, whilst foreign ownership and the negative 
perspective of replacement capital may reflect foreign owners confronted with 
the scale of modernisation required. The negative impact of firm age in the 9th 
decile may indicate that older firms have difficulty with ageing assets and the 
required cultural changes. Negative effects of skilled workers and positive effects 
of labour costs feature significantly throughout the distribution and give 
credence to the possible explanations given earlier in this paper.  
The IVQTE model has tested H2c, H3, and H4, and concludes that the 
availability of loans improves productivity up to the 6th decile of the distribution 
curve, suggesting that the least productive firms are the beneficiaries. This may 
be because the most productive firms are better capitalised or are less reliant on 
debt. The key is membership, and this is particularly true of the services sector, 
where firms up to the 8th decile have strong statistical significance. The effect in 
manufacturing is more muted beyond the first two deciles, with weaker 
coefficients and significance. Equally, the service sector appears to have a greater 
reliance on loans (H2), with the first six deciles enjoying the benefits, as opposed 
to manufacturing where loans are only significant in the first two deciles. 
However, in this sector, rental capital (leasing) is significant up to the median, 
which may indicate that leasing is used as an alternative to loans since the 
equipment leased provides its own collateral. The effect of FDI on productivity 
(H3) is highly significant but is only supported in the services sector with 
significance across the productivity distribution curve. This may be due to the 
strength of the services sector in the economy, where it accounts for 66% of 
added value in Serbia and Kosovo, increasing to 79% in Montenegro, and is 
therefore likely to be a more attractive target for FDI. Manufacturing, on the 
other hand, at least in BEEPS, is populated by low-tech SMEs, and with the 
increasing cost of labour in the Balkan region, firms may be losing some of their 
comparative advantage. Equally, it has to be recognised that prior to the 
financial crisis the Balkan region enjoyed significant inflow of funds, but this 
has reversed since then, and the 2013 BEEPS may well be reflecting this trend 
(Gabrisch et al. 2016). A puzzling result is the lack of support for H4, on the 
effect of exports on productivity, which is not significant in any sector. This may 
be due to the low level of exports from seven of the eight countries, where they 
account for no more than 20% of GDP, and, whilst there is evidence some 
countries are well integrated in international production networks, some 60% of 
exported goods are from low-tech industries and tourism, where increasing 
labour costs diminish any comparative advantage (Gabrisch et al. 2016). 
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Figures A4 to A9 in Appendix A confirm that the effect of EU membership and 
loans declines as the productivity of firms increases; the only exception being in 
the loan model, where the efficacy of loans in the service sector rises to the 
median point and then rapidly declines.  
Throughout the conducted quantile analyses, negative skill levels and positive 
cost per worker feature throughout the distribution, and whilst the positive cost 
per worker reflects the comparative advantage of cheap labour, driven by high 
levels of unemployment in the Western Balkans, the negative coefficient of 
skilled labour is the result of a mismatch between the demand of the burgeoning 
services sector and new technologically based businesses. This is due in part to a 
failure of the education system to adapt to the changing skill set required in the 
working age population (Bartlett 2013).  
CONCLUSIONS 
Our results indicate that EU membership contributes to improved productivity 
because of unfettered access to the customs union, which promotes 
opportunities for improved economies of scale and the advantages of network 
effects. The significance of loans and rental capital in relation to firm 
productivity is consistent with the findings in Levine and Warusawitharana 
(2014). The first hypothesis that EU membership provides a productivity 
advantage to firms in member states is supported by the findings of the IPWRA 
model; however, the additional provision of loans has no significance. The 
IVQTE model, whilst not designed to provide comparative measurements, does 
indicate that membership has the greatest benefit in the services sector, with 
significance in all but the 9th decile. Manufacturing is more muted, with support 
restricted to the first six deciles against a background of diminishing 
significance. The second hypothesis that loans improve productivity, enhance 
EU membership, and improve productivity outside the EU is only supported in 
the latter case. The IVQTE model indicates that loans are significant to the 6th 
decile in the services sector but only the first two deciles in manufacturing, 
suggesting that there is greater utilisation of loans in the former. However, 
rental capital (leasing) is significant to the 5th decile, which may suggest that 
loans are significant for firms in both sectors at the lower end of the 
productivity distribution curve, with those beyond the median being better 
capitalised. The third hypothesis that FDI has a positive influence on firm 
productivity is only tested in the IVQTE model, and we find that it has a 
positive influence in the services sector across all the deciles except for the first. 
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This indicates that FDI has a positive influence throughout the sector, apart 
from in the least productive firms. No significance has been found in 
manufacturing, which may reflect the low-tech nature of the Balkan region 
manufacturing sector proving of no interest to foreign investors (Gabrisch et al. 
2016). Surprisingly, given the evidence of literature, the fourth hypothesis that 
exports positively influence productivity has no support in either the 
manufacturing or services sector. This may echo Gabrisch et al.’s 2016 findings 
that exports in the region constitute a small percentage of GDP.  
These results have several policy implications for both member and non-
member states. There is little doubt that further enlarging the EU to include the 
Western Balkans would be a major boost to their economic development and 
provide a route out of localism rooted in the ethnic and ideological forces in the 
region. Both membership and loans appear to benefit the least productive firms, 
except for in the service sector, where both have universal appeal. There is a 
need for greater emphasis on the manufacturing sector, where rental capital is 
positively effective amongst the least productive firms and where enhanced 
financial intermediation would improve supply and provide capital for technical 
innovation to improve productivity. Whilst intermittent, the negative influence 
of replacement capital is problematical in manufacturing across the distribution 
and support for an asset-replacement programme appears desirable. The fact 
that 90% of the sample consists of SMEs provides clear evidence of where 
improvement can be achieved amongst the least productive in this sector. The 
clear success of the service sector in attracting FDI should encourage 
governments to improve the manufacturing environment and provide a 
platform to emulate this performance. A programme of modernisation 
incentives should encourage productivity improvements and lead to an 
encouraging environment for FDI. The paucity of skilled workers must be 
addressed, and whilst labour costs would appear to be a comparative advantage, 
income levels may need to be increased to encourage the development of an 
improved skill base. Equally, the issue may be one of management, where the 
need is to improve quality and ensure that a more skilled cadre of managers is 
provided with an appropriate slice of the economic cake (Adalet McGowan and 
Andrews 2015, p.32). A further conclusion can also be drawn from the results 
that indicate that the disparity in relation to output per worker is sufficiently 
constrained as to suggest that, at least at the firm level, the rest of the Balkans 
states are ready to embrace the accession process. 
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Notwithstanding its contribution, this study suffers from limitations that serve 
as avenues for further research. Firstly, causality issues may result from any 
unobservables not identified within the matching model. This may also arise 
from the cross-sectional nature of the data. Secondly, because of the limited 
number of countries studied, the paucity of observations for service sector 
capital and skilled workers means that it was not possible to measure the 
influence of capital on the service sector. Thirdly, the influence of the control 
variables across the productivity distribution curve merits further investigation. 
Finally, tracking progress from accession to 2013 would also allow the creation 
of longitudinal data and contribute to the question of whether the Balkans are 
different (Estrin and Uvalic 2016, p.1). Further research, utilising the BEEPS 
data over a longer period and including the 27 Eastern European transitional 
economies, may allow these omissions to be addressed.  
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Table A1: Variable Descriptions. 
Variable name Variable description 
Treatment variables in the QTE model 
EU member DV=1 if firm operates in an EU member state; zero otherwise. 
Loan receipt DV=1 if firm received a loan; zero otherwise.  
Outcome variable  
Output per worker Log of output per worker derived by dividing total sales by total full-time equivalent employees 
Independent variables  
Capital (net assets) Net asset value in US dollars. 
Capital (replacement) The cost of replacing current capital stock at 2013 values in US dollars. 
Capital (rental) The cost of renting land property and equipment in US dollars. 
Exports  The percentage of exports to total sales. 
Skilled workers The number of skilled production workers employed. 
Cost per workers The total cost of operations per worker in US dollars. 
Foreign-owned Percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors 
Firm age Age of firm derived by subtracting the date of formation from 2013. 
Bureaucracy 
The average of a Likert scale score (0 – no obstacle to 4 
– very severe obstacle) of perceived problems with 
customs, tax administration, business licencing, and 
labour regulations. 
Firm size 
Categorical variables = 0 if a firm has less than five 
employees; = 1 if a firm has more than four and less 
than 20 employees; = 2 if a firm has between 20 and 99 
employees; = 4 if a firm has more than 100 employees. 
Competition DV=1 if a firm reported that the number of its competitors was less than 15; zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX A 
Figure A1: Checking the overlap assumption (common region) for the full sample. 
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Figure A2: Checking the overlap assumption (common region) for the 
subsample of firms in the service sector. 
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Figure A3: Checking the overlap assumption (common region) in the 
subsample of firms from the manufacturing sector. 
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Figure A4: Results from the QTE model for the full sample with EU 
membership as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval. 
Figure A5: Results from the QTE model for the manufacturing sector with EU 
membership as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval. 
‐0.4
‐0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
EU 
membership
Quantile 
QTE for the full sample 
‐0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
EU 
membership
Quantile 
QTE for the manufacturing sector
FIRM PRODUCTIVITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
49
Figure A6: Results from the QTE model for the service sector with EU 
membership as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval. 
Figure A7: Results from the QTE model for the full sample with access to loans 
as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure A8: Results from the QTE model for the manufacturing sector with 
access to loans as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval. 
Figure A9: Results from the QTE model for the service sector with access to 
loans as a treatment variable.  
 
Note: Dotted lines show upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval.  
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